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The current ﬁ  nancial crisis is a painful reminder that the developed world is not yet immune to these devastating shocks. 
But while we haven’t learned to prevent them, we have learned some lessons about what is necessary to contain them 
once they begin and to limit the damage that follows. As policymakers worldwide focus on resolving the current ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, they might look to Sweden as a useful model for effective strategies.
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Decades of institutional development in the global ﬁ  nancial 
system have not removed the specter of ﬁ  nancial crisis from the 
landscape. The current worldwide credit crisis was preceded in 
the past 15 years by debt and currency crises in Latin America 
and East Asia, not to mention the collapse of Long Term 
Capital Management, a large hedge fund in the United States. 
However, the most severe events have generally occurred 
outside of the developed world, where regulatory frameworks, 
ﬁ  nancial policy, and industrial maturity were thought to have 
ended an era of large macroeconomic ﬂ  uctuations. 
Yet the current credit-market tumult reminds us that the devel-
oped world is still acutely susceptible to ﬁ  nancial crises. While 
governments and regulators haven’t managed to prevent these 
crises, they have learned some valuable lessons about what 
is necessary to contain them and limit the economic damage 
that follows. Financial crises often spring from imbalances in 
the economy, such as an overexposure to risk brought on by 
booming asset markets. Researchers have identiﬁ  ed a num-
ber of practices that seem successful at stopping the ﬁ  nancial 
bleeding brought on by a crisis while also preventing similar 
excesses from reemerging in the future.
In this Commentary, we describe these crisis resolution practices 
and discuss the way in which Sweden applied them in the 
early 1990s. The Swedish banking crisis is a useful example 
for two reasons. First, at the onset of the crisis, the country 
had a modern banking system similar to those found in other 
advanced economies. At the same time, Sweden’s disciplined 
management of the crisis—which followed the bursting of a 
credit bubble—appears to have minimized the impairment to its 
future economic prospects. 
Resolving Financial Crises 
We maintain that the goal of any resolution strategy should 
be to transfer assets from failed ﬁ  nancial institutions to 
institutions that can put the assets to their most efﬁ  cient use, 
and at the least possible short and long-term costs to the tax-
payer. As in most things, this is easier said than done. When 
faced with ﬁ  nancial markets and institutions that appear to 
be spiraling out of control, regulators and policymakers often 
resort to blanket guarantees of uninsured deposits and other 
liabilities by providing unlimited liquidity to ﬁ  nancial markets 
until the crisis dissipates. 
While blanket guarantees might be policymakers’ best choice 
given the urgency of bringing some calm to markets, history 
shows that such guarantees have their dangers: They bail out 
investors who should have done a better job at evaluating and 
managing their risks and disciplining ﬁ  nancial institutions that 
were mismanaging their money. It is worth emphasizing this 
point, as the smooth operation of our ﬁ  nancial system depends 
on market discipline. In normal (stable) ﬁ  nancial environ-
ments, investors protect their investments by actively monitor-
ing people who manage their money. By refusing to provide 
funding, they can raise borrowing costs for ﬁ  rms and force in-
effective or imprudent management to change. Limiting losses 
for investors during a crisis causes them to anticipate bailouts 
in the future, which erodes their incentive to do such monitor-
ing during the good times. Likewise, pledges by policymakers 
to extend unlimited liquidity to troubled institutions open the 
door for investors to exit their investments without incurring 
losses in their entirety, potentially leaving taxpayers to take the 
hit further down the line.
Nevertheless, it is possible for regulators to clean up systemic 
messes without inviting new ones. In a recent paper, economists 
Emre Ergungor and James Thomson analyze the research done 
to date on the impact of different approaches taken to resolve 
ﬁ  nancial crises across the globe. They identiﬁ  ed a handful of 
practices common to successful ﬁ  nancial crisis resolutions. 
Most important, according to Ergungor and Thomson, is that 
successful crisis resolutions have been characterized by trans-
parency. When ofﬁ  cials move to contain a ﬁ  nancial crisis, 
their primary task is to identify which institutions are viable 
and which assets are good, and conversely which institutions 
are insolvent and which assets are bad. This triage and full 
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ing the ﬁ  nancial institutions and makes it possible for the 
viable institutions to raise new funds from private investors 
or from the government if private sources are not available. 
Failing to acknowledge the true value of assets or the condi-
tion of troubled banks early on makes it easy for them to live 
on as propped up “zombies” (as happened in Japan during the 
1990s)—healthy on paper but economically insolvent. Initial 
full disclosure avoids these situations, and improves efﬁ  ciency 
during industry restructuring. 
Second, crisis resolutions have been most successful when 
they were handled by a politically and ﬁ  nancially indepen-
dent agency. Granting independence to those responsible for 
containing the crisis and restructuring shields decision makers 
from political pressures, which mount as institutions are closed 
and assets are liquidated. The decision to close a ﬁ  nancial 
institution or a business must be an economic, not a political, 
one. Financial independence is necessary to give credibility 
to political independence: If a government agency holds the 
purse strings, it can dictate policy. Independence from chang-
ing political environments is also important because it allows 
for a rapid response to emergent funding needs (as when new 
losses are discovered in a ﬁ  nancial institution). Having to wait 
for the legislature to appropriate funds in these situations can 
be impractical. 
A third practice associated with a successful resolution strategy 
is the maintenance of market discipline. Without it, note 
Ergungor and Thomson, the stage is set for future crises. If 
market discipline is to be effective, investors who assumed 
greater risks must be credibly exposed to loss; that is, they 
must suffer the consequences of having ignored or failed to 
detect signs of trouble. Blanket guarantees of uninsured depos-
itors and investors are an example of a policy maneuver that 
might lessen the pain of a crisis but could also distort market 
discipline. As numerous historical examples demonstrate, the 
stability of ﬁ  nancial markets after crises largely depends on the 
incentive framework that is left in place. 
Finally, Ergungor and Thomson observe that containing 
troubled ﬁ  nancial assets and restructuring institutions has 
typically not been enough to resolve a ﬁ  nancial crisis entirely, 
though doing so positions the system to return to more nor-
mal functioning. They ﬁ  nd that full crisis resolution must also 
achieve some restoration of credit ﬂ  ows within the economy. 
For that to happen, the creditworthiness of borrowers must be 
restored throughout the economy—a difﬁ  cult task, given that 
the economic fallout from a crisis (such as rising unemploy-
ment) actually erodes credit quality further. 
The case of Sweden—one of the relatively successful crisis reso-
lutions of the past 30 years—provides good insight into most of 
these practices. 
The Swedish Financial Crisis
The early 1990s crisis in Sweden followed a massive credit 
bubble largely characterized by speculative real estate ventures 
and booming consumer debt. With inﬂ  ation creeping up and 
growth stagnating in the 1980s, Swedish policymakers gave a 
boost to economic growth by loosening lending restrictions on 
banks and devaluing the country’s currency, the krona, which 
was kept at a ﬁ  xed exchange rate. Domestic banks used their 
new-found power to pump credit into a system with pent-up 
demand. Foreign investors were happy to channel their money 
to this underserved credit market. The economy boomed on 
funds borrowed in foreign currencies. 
The reckoning came in 1990, when Germany was reuniﬁ  ed 
and its deﬁ  cits soared. The Swedish krona, which was strongly 
tied to the German mark, automatically imported Germany’s 
high interest rates to Sweden. This started to squelch demand 
for real estate, and when the Swedish government eliminated 
its consumer debt subsidy, demand in this market all but dis-
appeared. Real estate prices that had more than doubled in the 
1980s now fell more than 40 percent (see ﬁ  gure 1). Then in 
1992, the krona plummeted in value after it was taken off the 
ﬁ  xed exchange rate. Banks, businesses, and individuals that 
had borrowed in foreign currencies—but whose incomes were 
in kronas—found themselves unable to meet their obligations. 
Domestic nonperforming loans hit 11 percent of GDP in 1993. 
With conditions so dire, and with Swedish banks so heavily 
exposed to the real estate market, the banking system began to 
disintegrate. In 1991, two of Sweden’s largest banks, Fören-
ingsbanken and Nordbanken, fell below their required capital 
levels. Afraid of a meltdown, the government guaranteed all of 
Nordbanken’s liabilities and took ownership of the bank, while 
at the same time arranging a guarantee for Förenings. When 
a third large institution, Gota Bank, was taken over shortly 
thereafter, the government was left holding 22 percent of the 
nation’s banking assets. Policymakers acted quickly to separate 
the good from the bad. Government-held assets that were 
deemed viable were merged under one name, Nordbanken, 
and permitted to continue operating. Bad assets were trans-
ferred to two asset management companies (AMCs)—Securum 
for Nordbanken’s assets and Retrieva for Gota’s. 
Figure 1: Housing Price-Rent Ratio in Sweden
Note: Shaded bar indicates a recession.
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liquidating the bad assets of these banks, but also with tak-
ing on the assets of nonbank companies that were in default. 
Swedish legislators made sure that the AMCs were adequately 
capitalized and granted exemptions from regulatory rules that 
would have rushed their actions or limited their effectiveness, 
including an existing rule that required seized collateral to be 
liquidated within three years. 
Often, the AMCs became managers of otherwise private, 
failed companies, performing such tasks as hiring and ﬁ  ring, 
managing property, and changing operation strategies until 
their assets could be favorably sold. Their tremendous ﬂ  ex-
ibility and ﬁ  nancial resources shortened their own existence 
from an expected duration of 15 years to a few years. Liquida-
tions were completed in 1997, and what funds the AMCs had 
remaining (less than half of their original capitalization, in real 
dollars) were returned to the Swedish treasury. 
Is Sweden a Useful Model for Crisis Resolution?
On the surface, it would appear that Sweden’s resolution of 
the crisis was a success. The nation returned the assets of 
failed banks and corporations to more productive uses via 
asset sales, and avoided the economic carnage that could have 
followed a complete systemic meltdown in the ﬁ  nancial sector. 
However, the global economic boom that marked most of the 
1990s makes it difﬁ  cult to disentangle keen Swedish policy 
choices from macroeconomic “luck” when examining the 
resolution’s outcome. 
An IMF study by economists Valerie Cerra and Sweta Saxena 
further questions the extent of Sweden’s success in limiting the 
aftermath of the crisis. They found that the long-term trend of 
Swedish per capita GDP growth fell from at or above similar 
countries’ levels to a much lower level in a time interval that 
coincides with the ﬁ  nancial crisis. The trend has remained at 
these relative levels since, reminding us that temporary dam-
age to the ﬁ  nancial sector may have longer-lasting detrimental 
effects on the real economy. That some amount of macroeco-
nomic damage will follow a crisis is not surprising, given the 
ﬁ  nancial and, sometimes, structural rebalancing that a systemic 
panic necessitates.
Even at slower growth levels, Sweden emerged from its credit 
market turmoil without the zombie banks and nonexistent 
growth of Japan’s “lost decade” in tow. This achievement has 
to do at least partly with Sweden’s containment and resolution 
strategies. With regard to transparency, Sweden performed 
remarkably well. The magnitude of losses was established 
early on by a Bank Support Authority, which was independent 
from the Ministry of Finance and the central bank. Good 
assets were separated from bad assets, and the full extent to 
which government would be involved was clearly outlined. 
Initial transparency about losses at the outset likely avoided 
the “zombie” effect and what Douglas Diamond has called 
“evergreening,” a process whereby undercapitalized banks 
choose not to address problem loans because doing so would 
force asset write-downs, possibly prompting technical insol-
vency. The Swedish government’s swift moves to liquidate 
failed banks and its emphatic pledge to recapitalize viable ones 
avoided large-scale evergreening, the papering-over of losses, 
and the prolonged stagnation that lingering bad assets entail.
Sweden’s response to the crisis also extended considerable 
political and ﬁ  nancial independence to the AMCs, which 
allowed them to carry out their task with adequate resources. 
It also served as a public signal that their operations would 
not be subject to changing political winds. Similarly, Swed-
ish ofﬁ  cials’ relaxation of collateral liquidation requirements 
implied that the dispensation of assets would take place over 
an extended period of time. This regulatory change may have 
had conﬂ  icting effects on investor perceptions. On one hand, 
it signaled that a large overhang of assets would not ﬂ  ood the 
market early on and drive down the value of similar, privately 
held assets. However, early liquidation, even at what appears 
to be distressed price levels, can quickly return assets to more 
productive uses and lower the cost to taxpayers if asset values 
continue to slide. Though this is a difﬁ  cult balance to strike, 
Sweden’s AMC managers were at least given the option to 
liquidate at later times if they deemed it necessary. 
With respect to the restoration of credit ﬂ  ows, Sweden moved 
quickly to provide incentives to bank owners to inject addi-
tional capital into their banks or to inject government capital 
into banks directly, when necessary. AMCs played a key role 
in restoring the ﬁ  nancial health of the nonbank companies 
they were operating. Some viable corporations were allowed 
to survive through capital injections, though in return the 
government acquired a majority of their shares so that taxpay-
ers could proﬁ  t from any upside. Recapitalized institutions 
could return to ordinary operation, gradually rebuilding the 
creditworthiness of the overall economy. Credit restoration 
has proved to be among the most difﬁ  cult resolution steps to 
execute effectively, and it can involve different public–private 
hybrid models to enhance the probability of success. An alter-
native to the Swedish method that is both bank and borrower-
based was attempted by Mexico in the late 1990s, with a 
program called Punto Final. The program subsidized 
60 percent of a loan if the borrower started repaying it, a cost 
that was shared equally by the government and the lender. The 
government’s share of the cost would also increase in propor-
tion to the number of new loans the lender made. This had the 
effect of subsidizing only good loans (failed borrowers would 
rather default than keep throwing money at a loan they could 
not repay) and incentivized lenders to start credit ﬂ  owing again. 
Sweden’s success at maintaining market discipline was 
perhaps more limited. Ideally, discipline can be sustained by 
not taking actions that may weaken investors’ incentive to 
discipline, such as issuing blanket guarantees and unlimited 
liquidity. In the Swedish case, policymakers avoided the 
liquidity pitfall but still ended up guaranteeing bank liabili-
ties before the banks themselves were taken over. Investor 
disincentives to closely monitor ﬁ  nancial institutions in the 
future may still exist as a result. The economists Edward 
Kane and Daniela Klingebiel have suggested an alternative 
to such incentive-skewing guarantees. They have argued that 
the optimal response to a systemic banking crisis is to call a 
bank holiday long enough for examiners to determine which 
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banks are viable, while still giving insured depositors access 
to their funds. Doing so would insure business as usual for 
insured depositors without permitting uninsured depositors to 
cash out before taking their share of unrecoverable losses.
Most of the criticisms that can be leveled at the Swedish crisis 
resolution are easy to make in hindsight. Facing the prospect 
of imminent systemic collapse, incentive-skewing actions like 
blanket guarantees and liquidity provision can seem like sure-
ﬁ  re ways to restore conﬁ  dence and avoid meltdown. 
Sweden’s ﬁ  nancial crisis containment and resolution strategy 
largely avoided these mistakes. Policies were enacted transpar-
ently and with political independence, and attempts were made 
to restore credit ﬂ  ows in the broader economy. Although some 
research has shown that a per capita growth penalty has been 
exacted from Sweden, its postcrisis decisions avoided the pre-
ventable pain of holding toxic assets for too long.
Altogether, the Swedish case illustrates the trade-offs and 
considerations of market discipline that crisis managers must 
contend with if they are to minimize taxpayer losses and 
speed the return to a rebalanced, growing economy.
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